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We propose that two psychological dimensions, one relevant to relationships and group life (communion, C) and the other
to skill acquisition, talent, and accomplishment (agency, A), aid people in interpreting their social worlds. Moreover, our
analysis demonstrates the privileged nature of the C dimension and its relative stability compared to the A dimension
across contexts and cultures. In Study 1 we use a standard compilation of culturally universal practices and show that the
C dimension accounts for the majority of these universals, implying that the meaning of A traits varies more across
cultures than that of C traits. In Studies 2 and 3, we provide evidence for this proposal using different judgment paradigms
and cultural groups. The findings indicate that there is greater similarity and consensus in how people make sense of and
judge information from the C than A dimension. We discuss the findings in terms of the recurring challenges people face
over time as a result of living in groups. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Two core challenges humans have faced over millennia are on the one hand being accepted by others and becoming
socially connected and on the other having to manifest skills, competencies, and status, given available opportunities (cf.
Chance, 1988; Hogan, 1983). We argue that these two evolutionary necessities underlie the fundamental dimensions of
communion and agency discovered and used by researchers to describe various psychological phenomena in personality
and social psychology and related disciplines (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Bales, 1950; Leary, 1957; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum,
1957; for reviews see Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, &
Kashima, 2005; Ybarra, Chan, & Park., 2001). In addition to integrating the idea of life’s recurring challenges with these
fundamental dimensions, our analysis shows and explains why the communion dimension is privileged in terms of what
people think about and how they regulate behavior, and it also predicts and explains why the way people make sense of
traits and behaviors related to the agency dimension, compared to those related to the communion dimension, will vary
more across contexts, including cultural ones.
The first challenge, connecting with others and being accepted, is addressed by the communion dimension (C), which
deals with behavioral tendencies such as honesty and kindness and those relevant to group living and a sense of right and
wrong in interpersonal relationships. All groups, whether familial, cultural, or those that comprise a larger organization, exert
pressure on their members to get along and abide by group norms (cf. Homans, 1961; Monane, 1967). Because social
rejection is debilitating in many ways (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ybarra, 2002; Ybarra, Burnstein, Winkielman, Keller,
Manis, Chan, & Rodriguez, 2008), people generally carry with them the imprint of sociality and the motivation to be good
group members regardless of situation or context—thus communion should be a pervasive dimension in much of human life.of Psychology and Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, 525 East University
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s, Ltd.
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1084 Oscar Ybarra et al.The second challenge, acquiring skills, talent, and status, is addressed through the agency dimension (A), which deals
with characteristics and behavioral tendencies such as intelligence, competence, and diligence (also see Ybarra et al.,
2001). An essential feature of the agency dimension is that talents and skills are not manifested in a social vacuum, as
knowledge and solutions to technical or ecological problems cannot be transmitted without the ability to learn from others
(Whiten & van Schaik, 2007). Related to this, and unlike the C aspects of behavior, which are expected of all group
members, any particular agency-related problem (e.g., the need for protection) or opportunity (e.g., exploiting a resource)
should involve only a subset of people or necessitate specific skills and the division of labor. Thus, the occasions for
expressing or attaining certain skills, and the status and recognition that results from such displays, may be more limited
and tied to the situation (Wish & Kaplan, 1977). So, in terms of communion, most if not all people can strive to behave
(whether genuinely or not) like good group members. In terms of agency, though, different behaviors and skills are likely
to be elicited from different members depending on the context.IS ONE DIMENSION PRIVILEGED? SOCIAL COGNITION AND THE NATURE OF GROUP LIFEAlthough behavior and cognition are sensitive to the circumstances and contingencies in people’s lives, this does not
preclude that one dimension serves as a default by which people view the world, make decisions about it, and regulate
behavior. We propose that the C dimension is primary and serves as this default (also see Ybarra et al., 2001).
There are various reasons why the C dimension should be privileged. As discussed earlier, groups pressure members toward
following norms (cf. Homans, 1961; Monane, 1967), and people strive to be accepted as good group members (cf. Baumeister
& Leary, 1995). In these extended groups, reciprocal altruism is crucial (Trivers, 1971), as group life is based on getting along
and depending on relatives but also non-relatives. Therefore, monitoring others’ communion-related behaviors should be more
important than monitoring agency-related behaviors because C information reflects whether or not others intend to reciprocate
and abide by norms (Ybarra, 2002; Ybarra & Stephan, 1996, 1999; also see Cosmides, 1989). Agency-related information is
important in evaluating others, but it is less informative about their commitment to the group. Thus, being sensitive to
information about others’ C characteristics and behaviors helps sustain indirect reciprocity. This sensitivity should lead to the
C dimension being the primary dimension of interest for people in making sense of their surroundings and regulating behavior.
Research from our laboratory (Ybarra et al., 2001) is consistent with this suggestion. We tested how quickly people could
recognize stimuli related to the C and A dimensions. We reasoned that if people tend to be more concerned with the C rather
than the A aspects of behavior, then the C category and associates should be more accessible in memory, which should
facilitate the identification of stimuli related to the C dimension compared to the A dimension. Our findings supported this
proposal, as both older and younger adults engaged in a lexical decision task responded faster to words related to the C
dimension than the A dimension (Ybarra et al., 2001). Other related findings have shown that even after very short exposures,
people make more reliable C than A judgments (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Further, perceivers have greater interest in C than
A information in interpersonal judgment (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998), and when judgments are based on both
dimensions, the C aspects of the information are weighted more than the A aspects (e.g., De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; Lingle
& Ostrom, 1979; Martijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992; Wojciszke et al., 1998; Ybarra, 2001).
The above findings are consistent with the idea that the C dimension is privileged in information processing for different
reasons. In developing the present analysis, for our first study we wanted to provide additional and distinct evidence for this
proposal.STUDY 1: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL UNIVERSALSMethod
Materials and Procedure
We content analyzed Brown’s list of human universals (Brown, 1991, 2000). The list describes 372 cultural universals in
practices compiled from numerous ethnographies written about cultures from around the world. It contains those
(observable) universals that all of these cultures exhibit.Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1083–1092 (2008)
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The social basis of cognition 1085Two independent raters classified the 372 universals into one of four categories: communion, defined as practices
implicating social interaction, relationships, and the regulation of interpersonal behavior; agency, defined as practices
enabling people to perform tasks, solve problems, and attain their goals; both, defined as practices that have both
communion and agency implications; and neither, defined as practices with neither communion nor agency related
implications. Examples of communion-related universals included: assessing relationships between self and others;
airness; taboos; generosity admired; affection expressed and felt; empathy. Examples of agency-related universals
included: tools; tool dependency; mental maps; memory; practice to improve skills; critical learning periods. Examples of
universals placed in the ‘‘both’’ category included: healing the sick; dance; government; division of labor; collective
decision making; economic inequalities. Finally, examples of universals placed in the ‘‘neither’’ category included:
wariness of snakes; liking sweets; right-handedness as norm; sucking wounds; being ambivalent; sickness and death seen
as related.
The raters reported no problem with the categorization scheme and showed 70% agreement overall. Given the number
of judgments to be made (372) across four judgment categories, the level of agreement is reasonable. The analyses that
follow are based on taking each rater’s counts across the four categories and averaging them. One could imagine that the
common denominator and most basic requirement of all human existence is the need to master one’s environment, and
therefore expect that a majority of universal cultural features and practices would fall along the agency dimension. We
made instead the opposite prediction: because navigating group life should be prior to navigating one’s external
environment, and because smooth social functioning is a prerequisite for viable cultures, we predicted that the basic
common elements shared by most cultures would deal with the communion-related dimension.Results and Discussion
The results indicated that out of the 372 universals, 244.5 of them could be classified into the C category, the A category,
and the ‘‘both’’ category. So 66% or 2/3rds of the universals have C and/or A implications.
Of greater interest, we examined the percentage of universals that had to do only with the communion or agency
categories. For these two categories, there were 216 universals (avg. of raters’ counts), so the percentages we will present
next are based on this 216 total. The results indicated that 189.5 of them or just over 87% have to do with the C dimension,
whereas 26.5 of them or around 13% have to do with the A dimension, consistent with our hypothesis.
The research we reviewed earlier indicated that the C dimension is on top of people’s minds in terms of concepts
accessible in memory (Ybarra et al., 2001). An analysis of Brown’s universals (Brown, 1991, 2000) is consistent with this
conclusion but at a much broader and encompassing level. The cultural features and practices shared by most cultures
appear to be dominated by the social and interpersonal realm. Two explanations could account for this. First, it could be
that the C dimension so dominates social life that it includes most cultural traits, and that our analysis of shared traits just
reflects this. A second (and our favored) possibility is that communion-related traits are more stable across cultures than
agency-related traits, which would explain why they are over-represented among shared traits. Study 2 explores this
possibility.STUDY 2: PROTOTYPICALITY OF PERSONALITY TRAITS ACROSS CULTUREAlong with earlier arguments regarding the occasions with which different tasks or problems call for distinct or specialized
skills and the common need to divide labor, one implication of our analysis is that the content of the agency dimension (and
how people make sense of it) may be quite variable across situations (cf. Wish & Kaplan, 1977) and across cultural
contexts. For example, some cultures may rely on fishing technology and related skills, whereas others may rely on
foraging or hunting on land. In more industrialized settings, some cultures may rely on developing and exploiting large-
scale agricultural techniques, whereas others may rely on developing techniques for manufacturing textiles or computing
systems. However, despite differing ecological and work-related niches, all individuals regardless of culture are members
of a group-living species, which inspires people to get along, avoid social rejection, and consistently try to manifest traitsCopyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1083–1092 (2008)
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expecting greater similarity in how people make sense of the communion dimension than the agency dimension.Method
Participants and Design
Thirty-six students (14 men, mean age¼ 20.66) from the University of Michigan (USA) and 23 students (12 men, mean
age¼ 25.78) from Seoul National University (Korea) volunteered to participate in the study. All participants were
presented with positive and negative traits from the C and A dimensions. The materials were presented in the participants’
native language. The materials were originally developed in English and were then translated and back-translated by two
bilinguals to ensure equivalence in meaning.Materials and Procedure
We presented the participants with trait terms that pertained to either the C (positive and negative) or the A dimension
(positive and negative). Participants first read through a set of definitions. The communion-related dimension was defined
to participants as dealing with ‘‘characteristics relevant to social interaction and a sense of right and wrong in interpersonal
relationships.’’ The agency-related dimension was defined as ‘‘characteristics relevant to task accomplishment,
achievement, and attainment.’’
After reading the definitions, the participants were asked to indicate the extent to which each trait was prototypical of
the respective dimension, using eleven-point scales (0: not at all prototypical, 10: very prototypical). In total we presented
participants with 40 personality traits, 10 per combination of dimension and valence (positive and negative). The pool of
traits was taken from Ybarra et al. (2001, Study 2), who had had two judges classify the traits in line with the above
definitions. The traits included: trusting, harmonious, sympathetic, trustworthy, sincere, righteous, jocular, polite,
obedient, benevolent (positive C-related); rude, malevolent, crooked, withdrawn, hypocritical, injurious, resentful,
tyrannical, snobbish, rebellious (negative C-related); astute, inventive, skillful, knowledgeable, talented, methodical,
diligent, witty, attentive, purposeful (positive A-related); inept, hasty, sluggish, ignorant, irresponsible, lazy, mediocre,
disorganized, idiotic, haphazard (negative A-related).1 The traits were presented to participants in one random order. After
providing their judgments, the participants were debriefed, given course credit, and thanked for their participation.Results
To test our hypotheses, we wanted to determine if people across cultures would show higher consensus in rating the
prototypicality of the C-related traits than the A-related traits. In order to examine the degree of similarity in ratings, we
first computed the mean prototypicality rating for each trait and rank ordered it in each country. Then, within each
combination of trait dimension (C, A) and valence (positive, negative), we calculated Spearman rank-order correlations
between the ratings provided by the American and Korean participants.2
Based on our proposal that people should have a relatively more similar understanding of the C dimension and more
divergent understanding of the A dimension, we expected that participants would show reliable consensus in rating the1Although word frequency norms are not available for the Korean language, the traits used in these studies showed a trend in the direction of differing as a
function of dimension and valence using English norms (some values not available), with positive C traits being the most frequent. It could be suggested
that this might account for greater similarity in the ratings across culture. However, it should be noted that there was even greater consensus for the
negative C traits across culture, and these traits had the lowest word frequency norms. Thus, an alternative explanation based on the notion of differences
in word frequency is not tenable for different reasons.
2Our goal was to assess which traits were seen as most prototypical rather than to assess the extent to which any one trait was judged as prototypical, and
that is one reason we analyzed the rank orders instead of the interval level data. The second reason has to do with well-established effects on how people
across cultures differentially interpret and use Likert-type, interval level scales (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002). This is not an issue in Study
3, in which we use more frequency-based scales.
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1083–1092 (2008)
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The social basis of cognition 1087traits from the C dimension but less correspondence in rating the traits from the A dimension. The results indicated that
the correlations across cultures were higher and significant when participants assessed the prototypicality of the C-related
traits [rs (10)¼ .65, p< .04 for positive traits and rs (10)¼ .85, p< .002 for negative traits]. In contrast, for the A-related
traits, the correlations across cultures were not significant [rs (10)¼ .16, n.s. for positive traits and rs (10)¼ .44, n.s. for
negative traits]. We further assessed whether the degree of consensus between cultures for the C dimension was greater
than for the A dimension. Thus, we combined the traits across valence and calculated the Spearman correlations for each
dimension. The correlation between cultures for the C dimension was rs (20)¼ 0.77, p< .0001, whereas the correlation for
the A dimension was rs (20)¼ 0.30, p> .20. A test of the two correlations (Fisher r to z) yielded a reliable difference,
z¼ 2.08, p¼ .038. These results are consistent with our hypotheses.
The findings from Study 2 indicate that there is good consensus as to what constitutes the C-related aspects of behavior
across these two cultures, that is, the traits that govern social and interpersonal behavior. Whether rating the positive or
negative C-related traits, the correlations were high and significant. On the other hand, it seems more open to interpretation
depending on a person’s cultural heritage what constitutes the A-related aspects of behavior, that is, the traits most relevant
to performing tasks and accomplishing goals. The findings help to show that C-related judgments are not only more
common across cultures, but also that the understanding of what qualifies as the best exemplar of the A dimension is more
variable across contexts.STUDY 3: AMOUNT OF BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE NEEDED TO INFER TRAITS ACROSS CULTUREIn this last study we wanted to reinforce our analysis by using a different judgment paradigm and by contrasting different
cultural groups (US and Hong Kong). We asked participants to indicate how much behavioral evidence they needed before
they would judge a person has a particular trait characteristic. Research indicates that Westerners more readily infer
negative than positive C traits from behavior, consistent with a social vigilance tendency (Ybarra, 2001, 2002; Ybarra &
Stephan, 1996, 1999; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Reeder & Brewer, 1979). But given the present argument that people
should have a more similar understanding of the C aspects of behavior because of their common group-living experience,
the importance of remaining socially connected, and the importance of making sure everyone abides by group norms,
we reasoned that both American and Hong Kong participants would show similar judgment patterns for the C dimension,
requiring more evidence to infer positive than negative C-related traits.
On the other hand, given the present argument about the context dependency of the A dimension, we expected that
American and Hong Kong participants would show different judgment patterns for the A dimension. Specifically, previous
research has shown that Westerners readily infer positive compared to negative A-related traits from behavior (Skowronski
& Carlston, 1987; Reeder & Brewer, 1979), whereas non-Westerners consider A-related traits to be influenced by social
expectations, in addition to effort and dedication (Okagaki & Sternberg, 1993; Randel, Stevenson, & Witruk, 2000;
Stevenson, Chen, & Uttal, 1990; Stevenson & Lee, 1996). For non-Westerners, this should have the effect of masking
internal factors in the performance of such behaviors, which should result in the need for more information in ascribing
positive A traits. Thus, we expected that Americans would require less evidence to infer positive than negative A-related
traits, whereas participants from Hong Kong would show the opposite pattern.Method
Participants and Design
Seventy-one participants from the University of Michigan psychology subject pool and 87 students from the University of
Hong Kong taking a course on speech perception participated in the study. We presented participants with positive and
negative, C and A-related traits. The materials were originally developed in English and were then translated and back-
translated to ensure equivalence in meaning. One participant from the US and one from Hong Kong had missing responses,
so the degrees of freedom vary slightly across analyses.Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1083–1092 (2008)
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In a slight variation of a task used by Rothbart and Park (1986), participants answered the following question for each of
the presented traits: ‘‘Before you would say that someone is _______ (e.g., honest), how many times would you have to see
that person act the way _______ (e.g., honest) people act?’’ The questions were answered on five-point scales than ran
from (A) 1–2 times, (B) 3–4 times, (C) 5–6 times, (D) 7–8 times, and (E) 9–10 times. Thus, the higher the scores the more
evidence people require before they are willing to say a person possesses that characteristic.
Participants saw 12 traits from Ybarra et al. (2001) in one random order. Six of the traits represented positive and
negative characteristics from the communion dimension (positive: helpful, honest, friendly; negative: inconsiderate,
deceptive, hostile), and six represented positive and negative characteristics from the agency dimension (positive: creative,
intelligent, skillful; negative: unimaginative, stupid, clumsy).1 After providing their judgments, the participants
were debriefed, given course credit, and thanked for their time.Results
We created four summary scores for each participant, one for their ratings of the positive traits and one for their ratings of
the negative traits for each dimension. Then we submitted the scores to a 2 (Culture: US vs. Hong Kong) 2 (Dimension:
C vs. A) 2 (Valence: positive vs. negative) mixed design analysis.
The overall analysis produced a main effect of dimension, as participants required less evidence to infer C traits
(M¼ 1.99) overall than A traits (M¼ 2.31), F(1, 154)¼ 40.90, p< .0001. This finding seems related to those of Ybarra
et al. (2001) and Willis and Todorov (2006), who showed that people more efficiently process C-related information and
make more reliable judgments about it even after short exposure times. The analysis also produced a main effect of
valence, F(1, 154)¼ 4.13, p< .04, an interaction of dimension and culture, F(1, 154)¼ 5.17, p< .02, an interaction of
valence and culture, F(1, 154)¼ 8.09, p< .005, and an interaction of dimension and valence, F(1, 154)¼ 26.57, p< .0001.
The analysis also produced a marginal three-way interaction of culture, dimension, and valence, F(1, 154)¼ 2.87, p< .09.
The valence main effect indicates that people required more evidence to infer positive (M¼ 2.21) than negative traits
(M¼ 2.08). The dimension culture interaction indicated that for the C dimension Americans (M¼ 1.89) required less
evidence than the Chinese (M¼ 2.10). This was not the case for the A dimension (Americans, M¼ 2.31; Chinese,
M¼ 2.30). The valence culture interaction indicated that for positive traits Americans (M¼ 2.07) required less evidence
than the Chinese (M¼ 2.36). This was slightly reversed, although negligibly, for negative traits (Americans, M¼ 2.13;
Chinese, M¼ 2.04). The dimensionvalence interaction indicated that for the C dimension, participants required more
evidence to infer positive (M¼ 2.16) than negative traits (M¼ 1.82). For the A dimension a trend in the opposite direction
appeared (positive, M¼ 2.27; negative (M¼ 2.34).
Although the three-way interaction was only marginally significant, we had a priori hypotheses: we expected no
reliable differences in the pattern of participants’ judgments for the C dimension, but for the A dimension we expected
differences as a function of culture. To examine these hypotheses, we ran 2 (Culture: US vs. Hong Kong) 2 (Valence:
positive vs. negative) mixed design analyses within each dimension.The Communion Dimension
For the C dimension the analyses produced a valence main effect, F(1, 155)¼ 19.50, p< .001, as participants required
more evidence to infer positive (M¼ 2.17) than negative C traits (M¼ 1.82). There was also a main effect of culture, F(1,
155)¼ 4.00, p< .05, with Chinese participants requiring more evidence (M¼ 2.10) to infer traits than the Americans
(M¼ 1.89). Of greater relevance, the interaction of the two factors was not significant, F(1, 155)¼ 1.86, p< .18. As
depicted in Figure 1 (top panel), Americans required more evidence to infer positive (M¼ 2.01) compared to negative C
traits (M¼ 1.77), F(1, 70)¼ 6.07, p< .02, but so did the Chinese (positive, M¼ 2.33; negative, M¼ 1.87), F(1,
85)¼ 14.81, p< .0001. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of a social vigilance tendency across cultures for
the C dimension.Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1083–1092 (2008)
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The social basis of cognition 1089The Agency Dimension
For the A dimension, the analyses produced only one significant effect. Consistent with expectations, there was a reliable
interaction of CultureValence, F(1, 155)¼ 12.05, p< .001. As depicted in Figure 1 (bottom panel), Americans required
more evidence to infer negative (M¼ 2.48) than positive (M¼ 2.15) A-related traits, F(1, 69)¼ 11.48, p< .001, but the
Chinese participants required more behavioral evidence to infer positive (M¼ 2.38) than negative (M¼ 2.21) A-related
traits, F(1, 86)¼ 2.84, p< .09.
The findings from this study indicate that regardless of culture, at least those cultures examined in Study 3, participants
have similar behavior-to-trait theories for the C dimension, requiring more evidence before ascribing positive C traits to
others. This pattern is consistent with a posited social vigilance tendency in the C dimension (Ybarra, 2001, 2002; Ybarra
& Stephan, 1996, 1999) and more generally the idea that the need to monitor and regulate social relations is centrally
important for humans. For A-related traits, we found that Americans required more evidence to infer negative traits,
whereas Chinese participants showed the opposite pattern. These findings may reflect differences in how much credit is
given to innate and internal factors in the manifestation of intelligence and other A-related traits. Specifically, compared to
Americans, non-Westerners may abide by a behavior-to-trait theory that puts greater weight on social context, in addition
to other behaviors that support A-related traits, such as effort and dedication (Okagaki & Sternberg, 1993; Randel,
Stevenson, & Witruk, 2000; Stevenson, Chen, & Uttal, 1990; Stevenson & Lee, 1996). These additional factors should
mask internal factors in the enactment of behaviors related to such traits, which should result in the need for moreCopyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1083–1092 (2008)
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indicating that there will be more variation across culture and contexts in how people make sense of the agency dimension
compared to the communion dimension.GENERAL DISCUSSIONThe present studies have shown that the C aspects of traits and behaviors dominate what people think about and do. They
have also shown that how people understand and make sense of the C dimension varies less across cultures than how they
make sense of the A dimension.
Study 1 provided evidence for the first point by showing that across 372 observed cultural universals in practices, most
of them had either C or A implications, or both. And when we looked at those practices classified as only C or A-related,
the majority of them were assigned to the C-related category. Thus, a large percentage of what is universal in thought and
behavior deals with those aspects of life that are relevant to governing how people interact with others and manage group
life.
Studies 2 and 3 built on these findings to examine the idea that how people make sense of the A-related aspects of traits
and behaviors varies more across cultural contexts compared to the C-related aspects of behavior. Using different
paradigms and comparing different cultural groups, the results showed no cultural differences in judgment for the C
dimension. However, for traits and behaviors from the A dimension, the interaction involving culture was significant in
both studies. Thus, the C-related dimension produced more similarity across culture, whereas the A-related dimension
produced more variation.
The ubiquity of behavioral practices that relate to the communion and agency dimensions makes sense when viewed in
the context of the recurring challenges people face over their lifetime and the challenges humans have faced over
evolutionary time. On the one hand people need social connections and acceptance, given the many benefits such
connections offer (protection, availability of resources, finding mates). This challenge can be met by using the C
dimension in information processing and regulating behavior, as it is particularly relevant to group living and a sense of
right and wrong in interpersonal relationships. But people also need to develop and attain skills, talent, and status, which
are manifested through the A dimension. This challenge can be met by using the A dimension in information processing
and regulating behavior, given that the A dimension deals with how people make sense of problems, perform tasks, and
distinguish themselves from others.
The potential usefulness of the present results and analyses not only derives from putting the fundamental dimensions
in the context of life’s recurring challenges, but also from giving a primary role to the C dimension, especially as reflected
in the culture-related findings from Study 1. In our analysis, we further propose that a core feature of the A dimension is
that talents and skills, and the occasions for attaining and expressing such competencies, may be more limited and tied to
the current context. An implication of this reasoning, which we tested and found support for in Studies 2 and 3, is that how
people define talent and intelligence, core aspects of the A dimension, may be quite variable across situations, including
cultural contexts. On the other hand, with regard to the C dimension, despite differing ecological and work-related niches,
humans as members of a group-living species value being socially connected and thus carry the motivation to be good
group members and abide by group norms, regardless of context and cultural heritage.Limitations and Future Directions
Above we suggest that the communion-related dimension, due to its central role in helping people make sense of group
life, is not likely to vary across contexts, including culture. As observations accumulate it may turn out that a more accurate
way of characterizing the C dimension is that it will encompass some variability in how people make sense of themselves
and others, but that compared to the A dimension, it will vary less.
Part of the present analysis builds on the work of many other investigators conducting research in many different areas
across decades (for reviews see Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske et al., 2007; Judd et al., 2005; Ybarra et al., 2001). It is
important to keep in mind that much of the earlier research was data driven, with the final outcome often being theCopyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 1083–1092 (2008)
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The social basis of cognition 1091characterization of cognition or behavior as abiding by a small number of dimensions. The present analysis can be applied
to some of the earlier research to make some novel predictions too. For example, in studying dyadic interaction, Bales
(1950) showed that ratings of members of typical dyads (e.g., parent, child; teacher, student) fell along a task-orientation
(A related) dimension and a socio-emotional dimension (C related). The present analysis suggests, though, that the C
dimension might serve as a stronger predictor than the A dimension in these ratings, that C status may be more stable over
different groups or time, and that members will evaluate and achieve consensus about C status early on and before agency
or task status is even contemplated.CONCLUSIONIn discussing our analysis, we propose that there is a ‘‘social’’ readiness to people’s minds, a conclusion echoed in a variety
of findings (see Ybarra et al., 2001, 2008). This readiness for the C dimension makes sense given that the primary
challenge for people is to become and stay socially connected. These social connections, with an eye to ecological and
environmental demands, in turn may then provide the basis through which people develop and display skills and talents
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